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Abstract: Key management is critical to secure operation. Distributed control systems, such as Su-
pervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, have unique operational requirements 
that make conventional key management solutions less effective and burdensome. This paper pres-
ents a novel Kerberos-based framework for automated, disruption-tolerant key management for 
control system environments. Experimental tests and their results are presented to quantify the ex-
pected performance overhead of this approach. Additionally, Zeek sensor analytics are presented 
to aid in monitoring the health and security of the key management framework operation.
.H\ZRUGV Key Management, ICS, SCADA, Authentication, Disruption Tolerant, Kerberos
Introduction
Key management and access control infrastructure are fundamental to building secure systems; 
however, current key management and trust models were designed for enterprise Information 
Technology (IT) environments and do not suit the requirements of process and distributed control 
system environments (Baumeister 2011). These environments are geographically distributed with 
high-availability requirements that limit the ability of traditional centralised authentication and 
authorisation mechanisms Due to operational management di൶culties, the lack of a scalable tech-
nology to manage cryptographic keys for distributed (nergy Delivery Systems (DSs hinders as-
set owners¶ deployment of products to secure communications This problem is ampli¿ed as more 
renewable and distributed energy resources emerge and are integrated into the grid, increasing the 
number and complexity of (DS resources :ithout an industry-accepted, scalable, secure, and 
robust key management, authentication, and authorisation service meeting operational require-
ments, development of secure cyber-physical applications will be di൶cult Industry reTuires a 
cryptographic key and access control management solution to further the deployment of technical 
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solutions and to limit the risk associated with increased communication and functionality of smart 
grid applications.
Current key management and authorisation frameworks have been built around Internet operations 
and an always connected state. However, in some environments, the ability to query an online 
service for every authentication cannot be guaranteed, and the burden of updating and distributing 
revocation lists is too great. The electric utility industry, among others, needs a solution that pro-
vides the ability for distributed, intermittently connected systems to authenticate, while still pro-
viding robust centralised policy control and auditing to meet regulatory and best practice guidance. 
Also, most key management and authentication systems are designed for users and expect human 
interfaces and interaction. Control systems are designed to operate independently with limited 
human interaction. Providing automated services that enable devices to receive key material and 
authenticate each other is necessary for control systems. A new approach is needed that is tailored 
to the unique aspects of distributed control systems.
While a new protocol could be developed to address these problems, leveraging existing stan-
dardised and accepted protocols enables deployment and integration at a much more rapid pace. 
The Kerberos protocol is a well-established, widely accepted authentication and key management 
protocol that is already deployed and utilised in most enterprise environments. Through use of a 
novel architecture and deployment, Kerberos can be leveraged to provide the needed feature set 
for SCADA environments while providing a wealth of knowledge, experience, and software to 
support a usable and manageable rollout.
This paper describes an Automated Disruption-Tolerant Key Management ADTKM system built 
upon the Kerberos protocol for distributed automation and other control systems The ADTKM 
leverages the unique characteristics of Kerberos for multiple domains of trust to enable centrally 
controlled authentication and remotely managed authorisation of devices to distribute key material 
for utilisation in secure applications. The Kerberos ticketing system provides the ability to operate 
in a disconnected state for a period of time. With some creative utilisation and operation, Kerberos 
can be the solution needed for this industry. Key management itself is often targeted in attacks; 
and, as such, developments for monitoring the health and security of the ADTKM approach are 
also presented (xperimental tests were performed to Tuantify the cost of this approach and to 
validate self-monitoring. The experiments, their results, and lessons learned are documented at the 
end of this paper.
Related Works
Key management and authentication are foundational to security operations. As such, there are 
various approaches, some well-established and used extensively, for distributed key material and 
authenticating access. This section provides an overview of the relevant work that has been done 
for applying key management frameworks to control system environments. The issues with dis-
ruption tolerance of common key management techniques is also detailed.
Theoretical models of trust and key management have been developed for varying conditions. 
When sharing keys, it is crucial to validate the identity of the parties involved in case one party 
is deceived into sending secure data to the wrong destination. As such, there a variety of ways 
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identities can be authenticated and trust distributed. The most basic is symmetric key management 
where trust is evaluated and approved by the communicator on a case-by-case basis and each pair 
of communicating partners shares the cryptographic material through some mechanism such as 
manual or key agreement protocols Piqtre-Cambacpdqs 	 Sitbon  Secure Shell is an exam-
ple of symmetric trust where each partner must negotiate accounts and each new server ¿ngerprint 
must be approved as trusted.
The most common form of trust used is brokered trust, where some chosen authority is selected to 
bestow and validate identities. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the most common implementa-
tion of brokered trust for key distribution Certi¿cate authorities are the selected central authorities 
around which PKI works and certi¿cates are bestowed to users with various levels of validated 
identity The certi¿ed authority then provides authentication of identity for others Piqtre-Cam-
bacpdqs 	 Sitbon  Second after PKI is distributed trust, or web of trust, where trust is or-
ganically organised through peers validating and authenticating identities =immerman  For 
example, if Alice trusts Bob, who in turn validates Charlie¶s identity, Alice can extend that trust to 
Charlie. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is the de facto implementation of web of trust.
Finally, there is the trust-free model where everyone can validate the authenticity of data without 
validating identities of peers. Blockchain ledgers are an example of distributed trust (Sun, Yan & 
=hang  (ach model has strengths and weaknesses Brokered trust enables strong control and 
enforcement of policy Distributed trust is Àexible and dynamic and obviates the need for identi-
ties These features are valuable or counterproductive depending on each speci¿c use case
Currently, no key management framework has been accepted or deployed in great numbers across 
process control environments International (lectrotechnical Commission I(C  Part  
I(C  is a standard for implementing key management for the I(C  protocol suite I(C 
TC57 2019) and is the most formalised approach to key management in industry. Otherwise, there 
is a lack of deployment of general key management frameworks within SCADA systems. There 
have been multiple key management frameworks and protocols developed to address various is-
sues within process control. Some address the complexity and performance issues of deploying 
complex PKI systems Beaver et al  Tawde, 1ivangune 	 Sankhe  (brahimi, Koro-
pi 	 1aMi  Re]ai, Keshavar]i 	 MoraveM  Others provide improvements to create a 
consistent process across the hierarchy of SCADA communicating devices (Dawson et al. 2006) 
or group key management facilities for speci¿c communication reTuirements of some protocols 
(Choi et al. 2009; Choi et al  Mittra  -iang et al. 2013). The SSP-21 secure communica-
tion protocol (Crain 2017) supports multiple key management approaches but has devised its own 
modi¿cations to the ; certi¿cate format to address some shortcomings with PKI +owever, 
this makes modi¿ed certi¿cate non-compliant with the entrenched PKI space and large number of 
tools provided which add further di൶culty to the deployment
The framework discussed in this paper is focused on solving the challenge of central policy con-
trol while enabling remote disconnected operation. Previous designs were developed using new 
hybrid protocol to achieve the desired feature set Man], (dgar 	 Fink  :hile the previous 
work met the functionality requirements design, it required a new, untested protocol with a lack 
of tool and technology support. Leveraging accepted standard protocols is necessary to increase 
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operational viability. The objectives of the work documented in this paper were to utilise stan-
dards-based solutions in a novel architecture to solve the problem while having readily available 
tools, expertise, and infrastructure to support deployments.
Process Control Authentication and Key Management Requirements
Process control systems have unique operational characteristics that require additional function-
ality for a key management solution (DSs have a hierarchy of communication where many dis-
tributed substations must operate independently and coordinate with a master station (Wang & Lu 
2013). The distributed systems need to operate even though the communication channels between 
the master control station and remote substations cannot be assumed to be reliable (Rezai, Kesha-
var]i 	 MoraveM  There are existing and continuing e൵orts to instil security into applications 
in legacy and future distributed ¿eld environments such I(C , I((( , and SPP- Crain 
 For resiliency, these secure applications operate between devices within ¿eld environments 
and must continue to operate with loss of connections to centralised control environments. There-
fore, authentication and key management processes must handle periods of disconnected operation 
without signi¿cantly increasing risk to the system A second reTuirement is to reduce management 
cost and burden Traditional key management systems, such as PKI, can Tuickly become di൶cult 
to manage at scale (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2010); accepting operational 
risk is often the path chosen to overcome these challenges The ADTKM system is tailored to 
address the uniTue properties of both the cyber and physical attributes of (DSs to ensure a strong 
foundation for implementing secure applications Four feature sets drove the design and execution 
of the ADTKM system
First, automating device key management relieves operational burden and increases the appeal 
of security applications. In enterprise networks, the authentication and key management process 
generally involves users accessing networked services; however, in control systems, the commu-
nication occurs mostly device-to-device. An authentication process for these environments must 
enable the automated communication establishment and maintenance between device-to-device 
communications.
Second, while distributed operation is crucial to maintaining stable and secure (DSs, distributing 
control of the system is labour intensive and resource prohibitive. A fully distributed system would 
limit the observability and management of operations necessary to ful¿l some of the regulatory 
collection and reporting guidelines of these environments (Critical Infrastructure Protection Com-
mittee 2009). Central policy management of authentication and authorisation is necessary, while 
still providing distributed operation.
Third, process control networks often require third-party access to equipment during emergencies 
and for regular maintenance by integrators and vendors. These external parties should be authenti-
cated, and access should be controlled via a key management framework. While this is an ancillary 
reTuirement, it is an added bene¿t of the ADTKM system
Finally, a common challenge within (DSs is the lack of ability for ¿eld devices to support nec-
essary levels of cryptographic security (DS eTuipment is often designed to last decades, and 
maintaining up-to-date security postures can be di൶cult Two areas in particular lack the ability 
to update for future security: having the resource capacity to perform advanced cryptography 
and having the necessary amount of high-entropy data available for performing the number of 
cryptographic actions. One of the most resource-consuming tasks that is fraught with risk is the 
generation of high-entropy key materials O൷oading key generation removes this risk by utilising 
an updatable platform design to generate large quantities of entropy data.
For this paper, a Dolev-<ao communication threat model Dolev 	 <ao  was utilised to drive 
the design of this key management system where the adversary can overhear, intercept, and syn-
thesise any message and is only limited by the constraints of the cryptographic methods used. As a 
restriction to this model, any tra൶c, synthesised or not, is mirrored to a self-monitoring capability 
Physical access to devices is provided to the adversary, under the condition that the defender is 
aware of such a compromise. In turn, the defender can put the device on a blacklist. The key ma-
terial on the compromised devices, however, stays with the compromised device. A detailed list of 
scenarios is provided in Appendix 2 of this paper.
ADTKM Architecture
The ADTKM system architecture is designed to accommodate the challenges and uniTue charac-
teristics of process control environments. Process control networks place more emphasis on avail-
ability and reliability than do other more generic IT networks Therefore, the ADTKM system has 
been designed with the assumption that the communication infrastructure between non-physically 
connected sites is unreliable. In addition to providing the functionality prescribed for the system, 
the ADTKM architecture is designed to reduce impacts on availability and operations as much as 
possible.
Figure 1, below, depicts the ADTKM system high-level architecture The diagram shows the in-
teraction between facilities within a utility¶s process control network as well as with a third-party 
entity that must interface with the process control equipment (an integrator or vendor). The various 
high-level communication interfaces are captured to showcase how the architecture ¿ts together 
and integrates into current process control system networks. The architecture depicted leans heavi-
ly towards SCADA-type infrastructure, but the ADTKM system architecture is designed such that 
it accommodates other process control networks.
The control centre facility houses the main functional components of the ADTKM system The 
control centre in a process control network is architecturally designed to control assets that are 
physically dispersed, either geographically or across disparate networks The ADTKM system 
mimics this characteristic and was designed to centralise the trust management functionality of re-
mote cryptographic assets Therefore, the maMority of the ADTKM system components are housed 
within the control centre.
The remote station represents a dispersed collection of assets that are physically separated from 
but monitored and controlled by the control centre. As previously mentioned, the design of the 
ADTKM system was created under the assumption that communication infrastructure between 
remote stations is unreliable. Figure 1, below, depicts the remote station to assist in describing 
how the interface operates in the face of unreliable communication infrastructure and a high-avail-
ability requirement.
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 Figure 1: ADTKM logical architecture diagram
In Figure 1, all items shaded light grey are components of the ADTKM system The remaining 
items are included as representative applications and entities within the process control environ-
ment These applications and entities show the integration of the ADTKM system into the process 
control network The interfaces and functionality that the ADTKM system provides to the applica-
tions are described using these representative applications.
Central Key Management server
The Central Key Management server CKM is the centralised control mechanism for the ADTKM 
system The CKM provides the location and interface for users to de¿ne policies and con¿guration 
settings for the rest of the system The CKM component is responsible for maintaining the process 
control system device identity enrolment data necessary to perform key management functionality. 
All cryptographic policies are maintained by this component. The information maintained by the 
CKM is the basis for the audit and forensic reporting capability of the ADTKM system
The CKM also provides centralised authentication and authorisation services All devices reTuest-
ing access to cryptographic material or entities requesting access to applications or resources must 
¿rst be authenticated to the CKM Authorisation roles are de¿ned and stored within the CKM 
component These roles are utilised by the CKM to provide authorisation information to the Cryp-
tographic Remote Trust Cache (CRTC) and end devices for allowing access to applications and 
resources. All authorisation and authentication actions are logged by the authentication, authorisa-
tion, and accounting service to support auditing and forensic activities.
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The CKM provides the interface with peer CKM services to enable cross realmdomain authenti-
cation and authorisation The CKM is designed to accommodate the reTuirements of third parties 
needing access to process control eTuipment for con¿guration or maintenance To reduce the oper-
ational burden of managing third-party entities, the CKM component is designed to support roles 
that extend to other organisations.
Cryptographic Remote Trust Cache
The CRTC provides remote, distributed operation capability while still enabling centralised con-
trol. The CRTC leverages a ticket-based authentication and authorisation capability to enable the 
remote stations¶ cryptographic services to continue functioning for a time in the event of failed 
communication with the control centre. When a device requests a new key or an entity attempts to 
log into a remote station device, the device must ¿rst authenticate with the CKM The CKM then 
provides a ticket with a con¿gurable lifetime that enables the CRTC to authenticate and authorise 
the device remotely. In the event of communication failure, the remote station can continue opera-
tion because the needed Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is stored locally.
The CRTC provides a reliable, cryptographically-entropic, random source to generate cryp-
tographic material It o൵ers the ability to generate all of the commonly accepted and used cryp-
tographic material such as di൵erent forms of symmetric and asymmetric keys and certi¿cates All 
cryptographic material in the system is generated by the CRTC component. The CRTC generates 
reTuired key material for devices integrated into the ADTKM system
Field unit
The ¿eld unit is the user of the ADTKM system Devices that must securely communicate will im-
plement the ADTKM client libraries in order to communicate with and collect key material from 
the other ADTKM components The ¿eld units could include any type of embedded ¿eld control-
ler or sensor such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), programmable logic controllers, Intelligent 
(lectronic Devices I(Ds, and the control room software services that communicate with them 
such as Object linking and embedding for Process Control (OPC) servers, SCADA servers, and 
communication processors.
The general Kerberos standard de¿ned in RFC  is for user authentication with a password 
+owever, the ADTKM system is targeted for machine-to-machine use, which does not utilise user 
accounts and passwords Therefore, the ADTKM system leverages the Kerberos protocol exten-
sion by RFC , Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos PKI1IT =hu 
	 Tung  to provide an authentication method using public key certi¿cates for identity and 
authentication The ADTKM system utilises PKI1IT, along with a combination of Trusted Plat-
form Module TPM Trusted Computing Group  and Institute of (lectrical and (lectronics 
(ngineers I((( AR I(((  :orking Group  for device identity
Zeek (Bro) monitor
Security monitoring has long been seen as an essential analogue to enforcement (Anderson 1980). 
This is because enforcement is typically incomplete in order to make security computationally 
tractable Schneider  andor usable, and because well-de¿ned monitoring can cover unfore-
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seen situations that enforcement might not know to cover. This is true for a variety of reasons (even 
for security protocols such as Kerberos which have been formally veri¿ed, not the least of which 
is because there can be gaps between protocol speci¿cation and implementation The ADTKM 
system is no exception Although ADTKM is itself a well-de¿ned protocol based on well-de¿ned 
components, including Kerberos, the system can still be attacked andor fail in unexpected ways 
Further, even in case of proper operation, it is desirable to simply have an independent record of 
events to provide Musti¿cation that the system is operating correctly +owever, by de¿ning known 
good states and alerting on deviations from them, akin to speci¿cation-based intrusion detection 
(Ko, Ruschitzka & Levitt 1997), at least those attacks can be detected if not defended against in 
real-time (Peisert et al  To monitor ADTKM operation, the open-source =eek npe Bro 
1etwork Monitoring System Paxson  is used to capture and report this information =eek 
is designed with the understanding of the communication protocols used in substations and of the 
behaviour of the rest of the ADTKM system with which it can determine anomalous behaviour of 
the protocol These deviations often represent a system failure or threat action The authors¶ use of 
Zeek is distinctive from the way that Zeek and other intrusion detection systems are typically used 
in that this study performs speci¿cation-based intrusion detection that is, alerting on actions that 
di൵er from a ³known good´ set of events rather than the more traditional misuse-based intrusion 
detection that is, alerting on actions that match a µknown bad¶ set of events Thus, in the case de-
scribed in this paper, Zeek plays an integral role in assuring that the protocol is operating correctly, 
rather than as a general security monitor.
Foundational Kerberos Feature Operation For ADTKM
The Kerberos protocol (Neuman et al. 2005) provides a perfect standards-based foundation to 
address the described challenges Kerberos ful¿ls the reTuirements for providing short-term dis-
tributed operation in times of lost communication while still enabling centralised management of 
authentication and authorisation. Also, Kerberos has capabilities to support enabling third-party 
communication with devices when needed. Some infrequently used capabilities, described in the 
following sections, of the protocol are leveraged to support the desired functionality of the ADT-
KM system
Cross-realm trust for separating authentication and authorisation and 
third-party access
The Kerberos protocol was designed to support cross-organisational and cross-domain authen-
tication Realms are de¿ned by Kerberos as the authentication control boundary for an identity 
Kerberos typically leverages a direct trust model. In such a case, a principle or inter-realm key 
is shared that enables the foreign realm to authenticate its users and generate TGTs for the other 
realm (Figure 2, below) This enables entities in one security domain to use the services in another 
security domain, or in the case of (DS integrators¶ or vendors¶ access to the devices they are con-
tracted to maintain.
Figure 2: Direct trust, cross-domain Kerberos authentication left as compared to ADTKM Kerberos service 
architecture (right)
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Additionally, cross-realm trust can enable disconnected operation. A normal Kerberos system is 
con¿gured as in Figure 3, below. To enable distributed authorisation and key generation, cross-
realm trust can be used for clients and services (again, see Figure 2, above) so that initial authen-
tication is done at the control centre and the key distribution is handled in the ¿eld Cross-realm 
trust allows domains of trust, generally entities of control such as di൵erent companies or di൵erent 
major units of companies, to enable accounts or users in one realm access to some set of services 
in another realm. The behaviour is enabled by sharing a trust between the two realms, allowing a 
TGT from one realm to authenticate to a service in another realm.
Figure 3: Traditional Kerberos architecture
Using cross-realm trust, it is possible to allow ¿eld environments to manage their own key distri-
bution. Operating a single realm in the control room where all account principles exist provides 
central policy control and auditing of what services can be accessed by equipment and people in 
the ¿eld (very ¿eld environment, or substation, operates its own additional realm where all ser-
vice principles are con¿gured Through the separation of authentication in the control room and 
authorisation in the ¿eld, all devices, when trying to connect with a service, must ¿rst contact the 
control-room realm to authenticate and receive a TGT with a policy-de¿ned lifetime That TGT, 
through cross-realm trust, can then be used within the local substation realm to get a service ticket, 
which includes the necessary keys to establish secure applications and access secure services. If 
94 Journal of Information Warfare 
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communication with the control room is lost, the TGTs still function for their lifetime and enable 
the retrieval and use of additional key material to interact with services, thereby allowing secure 
applications and services to continue operation between ¿eld eTuipment The separation of clients 
and services in this fashion enables the desired centralised control with temporary disconnected 
operation.
In Figure 2 above, the control room Kerberos service operates within the ADTKM CKM Field 
units, such as the RTU and relay, must ¿rst authenticate with the CKM :ith the TGT, they are 
then able to reTuest access to a secure service such as communication with peer I(Ds for safe-
ty processes or higher-level controllers for automation control such as remedial action schemes) 
through the local ¿eld Kerberos service running within the CRTC The service ticket from the 
CRTC includes key material that can be used for the requested secure service or application, in this 
case, the relay securely communicating with the RTU.
Authorisation extensions
The general application of Kerberos is as an authentication process for single sign-on. In this case, 
a user is authenticated by the Kerberos process, and then authorisation decisions are made by the 
end device based on the authenticated identity. However, Kerberos also provides the ability to 
extend and embed authorisation information to limit the applicability of service tickets Microsoft 
Corporation  One of the maMor users of Kerberos is Microsoft¶s Active Directory service for 
domain control, which embeds domain authorisation information into tickets to control service 
access The ADTKM system similarly leverages this ability to provide authorisation to device 
service communications. Kerberos uses Service Principle Names (SPNs) to authenticate to the 
appropriate service. In the Active Directory use case, the SPN is generally a combination of the 
service name, server domain name, and the application instance For control system environments, 
these concepts are not suitable. Some process control and SCADA protocols are object-oriented 
in design, where functions and obMects are well-de¿ned These protocols lend themselves to attri-
bute authorisation For instance, the I(C  I(C TC  standard provides descriptions 
of services and devices to support de¿ning a Kerberos SP1 for these environments I(C  
de¿nes logical device names and logical node names that represent services a device can provide 
By generating an SP1 from these two pieces of information, service access policies can be de¿ned 
:hile I(C  provides a use case with a strong capability to support the Kerberos protocol, 
there are other systems and applications that do not provide the same ease of mapping For these 
use cases, a mapping for SPN is necessary.
Experimental Evaluation
All security additions to a system have the potential to impact performance (ach use case has dif-
ferent performance reTuirements Performance impacts could be signi¿cant for some applications 
and inconsequential for others. It is important to understand the performance requirements of secu-
rity solutions before using them for an application. As such, some experimental tests were execut-
ed to bound the performance impacts expected from the ADTKM system under various conditions
The overall architecture used to evaluate the ADTKM was designed around a simple model of 
a SCADA system. A SCADA server in a control room is connected to an RTU substation. The 
RTU is connected to a ¿eld device relay The I(C  Manufacturing Message Speci¿cation 
MMS was the protocol used for SCADA communication An Opal-RT real-time digital simulator 
was con¿gured with an I(((  bus physics model for driving the system inputs to the relays 
The test plan included three phases (ach test phase focused on a di൵erent test con¿guration and 
system under test: a baseline system con¿guration, a system with the ADTKM solution integrated, 
and a system with an I(C  test setup All three test system con¿gurations are presented in 
Figure 4, below.
Figure 4: Baseline, I(C , and ADTKM test system con¿guration
Real equipment was used in the baseline case to quantify the behaviour of the test setup. The goal 
of this test phase was to validate the model and con¿gurations for realism and provide a baseline of 
performance to quantify the delta introduced by any key management and security actions. The use 
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of real eTuipment in the ¿rst phase helped calibrate the con¿guration and behaviour of simulated 
and proof-of-concept devices necessary in the second and third phases. In the baseline, the Tri-
angle Microworks SCADA Data Gateway software and the Schweit]er (ngineering /aboratories 
S(/  and  relays were leveraged
Phase 2 focused on testing the performance and operation of a prototype implementation of the 
ADTKM Since there are no commercially available operational devices that support the concepts 
in the ADTKM, it was necessary to use proof of concept relay software for testing device-to-de-
vice authentication and key management as described in the µField device prototypes¶ section, 
below The rest of the SCADA setup is consistent with the baseline The validated I(C  con-
¿guration ¿les from the baseline tests were used to con¿gure the proof of concept relays to ensure 
consistency and limit the number of introduced artefacts. In addition to the SCADA test system, 
the additional ADTKM components were added to the communication network This includes the 
authentication and authorisation services Key Management Server and Crypto Trust Cache as 
well as the system consisting of =eek sensors monitoring the di൵erent networks
The ¿nal setup for phase  was focused on evaluating the behaviour of an I(C  key man-
agement process Similar to testing the ADTKM solution, there is limited support for I(C  
in commercial relays therefore, software relays, provided through the Distributed Test Manager 
from Triangle Micro:orks, were necessary to evaluate this test setup The con¿gurations of the 
relays were again transferred and used within these software relays to ensure consistency for com-
parative analysis Finally, the PKI services necessary to operate the I(C  protocols were 
included in the network.
Prototype Implementations
To evaluate the performance of the ADTKM concepts, it was necessary to develop a prototype 
implementation. Prototype code and hardware was developed to enable testing and demonstration 
of the ADTKM approach The following sections provide an overview of implementations of the 
di൵erent architecture components
Cryptographic Remote Trust Cache prototype
The CRTC was deployed on an S(/- device running Ubuntu  It leverages its tick-
et-based authentication and authorisation capability through use of Heimdal (version 7.5.0), an 
implementation of Kerberos 5. The CRTC generates and registers all cryptographic material with 
the CKM for auditing and tracking purposes The tools used to generate reTuired key material for 
devices integrated into the ADTKM system include heimdal-clients , hxtools, and ktutil
CKM prototype
The Central Key Management server is built on a virtual Ubuntu  system and utilises Sam-
ba 4.0 as the Active Directory Domain Controller. Heimdal is used by Samba for the underlying 
Kerberos implementation All user accounts, groups, and authenticationauthorisation policies are 
handled by the Samba utility samba-tool For testing third-party trust scenarios, two or more in-
stances of CKM virtual machines are executed, where each CKM belongs to di൵erent domains of 
control or di൵erent companies Di൵erent realms and domains are established within each CKM
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to enable cross-realm authentication and authorisation. Kerberos keytabs are exported and shared 
to enable the cross-realm trust along with additional con¿guration through samba-tool
Field device prototypes
In order to enable ¿eld devices to communicate securely, it is necessary to have them enabled with 
client tools to operate within and test the ADTKM approach The prototype ¿eld devices were built 
on BeagleBone Black boards running /inux Debian  -essie The I(C  software library from 
SystemCORP was used to provide the I(C  standard operations Client Kerberos utilities 
were necessary for ¿eld devices to get the key material needed to establish secure communication 
Again, the Heimdal project is leveraged to provide the client software for interacting with the 
CKM and CRTC services The PKI1IT pre-authentication mechanism for Kerberos is used along-
side ; certi¿cates to provide device authentication to the CKM A TPM is reTuired to bind an 
identity of the prototype devices A SparkFun CryptoCape was utilised for TPM services to bind 
an identity to each proof-of-concept relay.
=HHN1HWZRUN7UD൶F$QDO\VHU
=eek runs on computers with non-intrusive (thernet tap access to communications between the 
key distribution server and the ¿eld devices within the remote station It monitors the packets that 
communicate to and from control devices containing keys, as well as between local and central 
ticket granting servers, and reports appropriately on normal operation and error conditions. A list 
of known compromised, lost, or stolen ¿eld devices is made known to =eek so it can properly iden-
tify revoked keys and ¿eld devices being misused Multiple =eek devices are strategically placed 
to monitor the communication between eTuipment and ADTKM components If an anomalous 
event is detected, an alert is generated and logged.
Results
To contextualise results of the testing, both baseline  operation and secured I(C  sys-
tem tests were performed for comparative analysis. The analysis of performance and behaviour are 
documented. Table 1, below, shows the high-level status of the tests run (as documented in Appen-
dix  Following the success and performance result discussions for each phase, the comparison 
of results is reported, providing information on how di൵erently the systems performed under each 
case The dash mark under I(C  represents that the test was not possible because of the way 
the standard was implemented by the application used in testing.
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Table 1: Test results summary
Normal communication
Very similar performance was expected between the approaches for normal communication; how-
ever, the I(C  performance was signi¿cantly slower Table 2, below). While uncertain, it 
is not believed that I(C  is the variable that causes the signi¿cant time di൵erence /imits in 
exactly reproduced test cases probably contributed to unexpected results The di൵erences in secu-
rity mechanisms, the underlying I(C  implementations, and underlying devices all probably 
had impact on these numbers.
Table 2: Average round-trip time for SCADA communication
Three variables could be confounding the results: the encryption protocol, the version of I(C 
, and the execution platforms The ADTKM solution uses Kerberos security encryption 
mechanisms, which is slightly di൵erent from the Transport /ayer Security used by the I(C  
protocol The ADTKM approach is focused on getting key material to the end units to establish 
whatever security protocol they desire; it simply uses the Kerberos security mechanisms as an easy 
method to prototype In addition, the I(C  implementations between the ADTKM and I(C 
 tests were di൵erent The ADTKM solution utilised the SystemCORP library while the I(C 
 test utilised the Triangle Micro:orks library Di൵erences in how the libraries implement 
the standard and perform functions could a൵ect the timing Finally, the platforms running these 
libraries were di൵erent The ADTKM ran on embedded BeagleBone Black systems running /inux 
and few additional services The I(C  ran on a :indows  laptop The platform variations 
could also a൵ect results
Ultimately, the key management approach should have little inÀuence on the normal secure com-
munication performance The protocols, mechanisms, and softwarehardware implementations all 
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are expected to have much more inÀuence on performance As expected, both tests added latency 
as compared to the baseline communication times. The additional processing for the cryptography 
and the additions of security data to packets will make the time to communicate slower but not 
signi¿cantly so for most use cases ConseTuently, the test results were inconclusive
:ith the addition of a custom handler to extract the state machine of ADTKM, =eek handled all 
the outlined threats completely, with two exceptions  The ¿rst exception is legacy devices, which 
requires that the secondary connection already used for the legacy device also be used for com-
munication between =eek at both the central location and the ¿eld level Thus, =eek handles this 
partially. The other exception is addressing communication between two already compromised 
¿eld devices, as encryption between the central key authority and the ¿eld devices prevents =eek 
from checking whether issued tickets are valid.
Session establishment performance
As was expected, it was found that the ADTKM had a slower performance in the time to estab-
lish a new session (Table 3, below There are several factors that inÀuence this result The ¿rst 
and most signi¿cant is that automated mechanisms to perform the authentication to the Kerberos 
authentication service were not developed. This step was manually performed. After completion, 
the ADTKM I(C  emulated device applications were then started Manual execution caused 
the large amount of time for session establishment of the ADTKM prototype If automated, it is 
expected the time would be a higher sub-second The ADTKM approach reTuires multiple session 
negotiations before the service ticket is ¿nally delivered to the end device First, the device must 
authenticate to the control room domain. With the control room domain TGT, the device can then 
authenticate to the appropriate substation domain of the device it wants to communicate. With the 
second TGT the device can reTuest the service ticket with the communication keys Multiple back 
and forth communications make initial session establishment slower than the I(C  protocol
Table 3: Average time to establish ¿rst session
The I(C  session establishment, on the other hand, is faster than would be expected in the 
default I(C  behaviour The Device Type Manager application only supports statically de-
¿ned Certi¿cate Revocation /ists CR/s, which are con¿gured when starting the application As 
con¿gured, session establishment reTuires only the time to negotiate a session between the two 
devices no third-party communication is reTuired For installations that utilised CR/ mechanisms, 
the session establishment performance will be the best. However, this approach has its detractions, 
discussed in the next section, and it is not the default option proposed by I(C  The default 
mechanism recommended is to use an Online Certi¿cate Status Protocol OCSP server, which 
provides real-time authentication of certi¿cates per session establishment The OCSP process only 
requires communication with one other third party instead of the three additional communications 
for the ADTKM process As such, the OCSP approach for new session establishment, while not 
tested, is expected to be faster than the ADTKM approach
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Session renewal
1ew session establishment for the ADTKM approach is a less freTuent event, designed to minimise 
the number of times it is required to communicate with the control room. As such, the general time 
for session establishment will be the time to renew a session. The session renewal process only 
requires the session negotiation between the local substation domain and the session establishment 
between the devices, thereby reducing the time to a session. Since this eliminated the manual step 
in the initial session establishment, the time di൵erence is signi¿cant in the test results Table 4).
7DEOH Average time to re-establish session security
There is no di൵erence in session establishment and re-establishment for I(C , so the times 
are the same. Again, the CRL method is the fastest because it does not require communication with 
a third party. The OCSP method does require communication with a third party, so this perfor-
mance is expected to be similar to the ADTKM session re-establishment performance
Discussion
Many things, beyond performance measurements, were learned from the comparative testing of 
the di൵erent key management approaches and implementations In this section, the Tualitative 
results of the testing are presented.
5HSOD\VSRR¿QJPDVTXHUDGLQJGHIHQFH
The replay, spoo¿ng, and masTuerading defences of both the ADTKM and I(C  are expect-
ed to be similar. Both approaches are designed to authenticate devices and prevent malicious en-
tities from manipulating data and acting like legitimate devices. Both approaches prevented these 
attacks from occurring Devising good tests for these types of attacks is di൶cult, and no attack 
implementation testing can cover every possibility; therefore, the tests show that these protocols 
are secure against simple attack attempts. However, since both approaches are built upon well 
established and accepted security mechanisms, their robustness to these attacks has been veri¿ed 
through previous research The ADTKM proMect also developed secondary security monitoring 
techniTues to detect when these types of attacks are attempted :hile the prototype ADTKM did 
not fully succeed as expected in all the test cases, the ability to detect attack attempts helps prevent 
further attacks against the system Similar capabilities could be developed to support I(C  
as well.
Authorisation
Deauthorisation is the process of revoking access and credentials from a device. The authorisation 
process is one of the de¿ning di൵erences of the ADTKM approach A device¶s identity is autho-
rised to a set of substation¿eld domains in the control room on session establishment The authori-
sation persists by a con¿gurable policy such as an hour, day, week, etc :hen authorised, an entity 
can retrieve session keys and communicate. Kerberos extensions also provide the mechanisms to 
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add function-speci¿c authorisations, such as accessing con¿guration management but not SCADA 
functions :hile this research did not delve deeply into function-speci¿c authorisation, it could 
add an additional granularity of authorisation that can be centrally de¿ned and managed
I(C , on the other hand, provides limited authorisation features The utilisation of certi¿cates 
is for authentication purposes but does not specify what an authenticated entity is authorised to do. 
This forces end units to handle authorisation processes, which requires distributed management 
and control (൵orts to embed authorisation information into the certi¿cates have and are being 
developed, but nothing has been standardised or established for this use case. CRLs have a long 
history of problems in managing them Distributing CR/s in a timely and e൶cient manner is dif-
¿cult This challenge is likely the reason I(C  lists the OCSP method as the default and rec-
ommended mechanism. The major limitation of the OCSP approach is a required communication 
channel to the central service which limits disconnected operation. OSCP stapling (Rescorla 2018) 
is a newer technique developed to allow a requesting service the ability to prefetch the OCSP au-
thenticity response to provide the peer device on connection. This technique approximates some of 
the bene¿ts of the ADTKM approach but does not address the authorisation challenges
Key material generation
In the ADTKM Kerberos approach, the session key material is generated by the substation¿eld 
domain servers. This alleviates limitations of end devices in generating enough entropy material 
for keys The I(C  certi¿cate-based approach forces the end devices to adeTuately generate 
key material for session use.
Disconnected operation
One of the key functional goals of the ADTKM approach is to support limited disconnected secure 
operations. The authentication and authorisation time period of this approach allows organisations 
to set policy on how long devices can continue to securely operate in a disconnected state. This 
allows them to tailor security controls to their risk posture and regulatory reTuirements The I(C 
 certi¿cate-based approach has less Àexibility in disconnected operation The CR/ method 
allows devices to operate in a disconnected state inde¿nitely This may not be appealing if the 
disconnected state was induced to attack the system and the devices should be disconnected for 
security andor safety The OCSP method forces an always connected situation, where any loss in 
communication with the control room leaves devices in an uncertain state of how to behave when 
a device cannot be authenticated.
Zeek network monitoring
Since key management provides the foundation of a system¶s security, it is a high-interest attack 
target and should be monitored =eek¶s attack detection provides the necessary functionality to 
monitor the behaviour of key management communication and is compliant with the ADTKM 
threat model This includes detection of tra൶c from compromised or stolen devices that were pre-
viously authenticated but whose keys were subsequently revoked, without the need to keep mem-
ory-expensive CR/s for an inde¿nite duration =eek monitors for correct use of the key exchange 
syntax and semantics as well as denial-of-service attempts and raises alarms if necessary. This also 
includes too many reTuests for a new key to the CKM itself Since =eek tracks process state mod-
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els, information collected by Zeek can also be used to support troubleshooting and error manage-
ment. Zeek allows clients to connect to its database to enable such queries. Zeek does a good job 
of tracking the real-time status of the nodes in a decentralised fashion (good for load balancing).
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented a novel key management design, using Kerberos, that solves some of the 
unique requirements of remote-control systems; a working implementation was also demonstrat-
ed. Kerberos is already a well-established protocol with a large install base. It can be leveraged to 
provide a secure foundation for security in remote process control environments using some of its 
more peripheral features. This enables leveraging of existing IT expertise for securing operational 
technology environments using a thoroughly tested and widely used framework.
The source code implementations for the base features (Seppala 2019) and the monitoring system 
(Gentz and Peisert 2019) have been released into open source. However, there is still a need for 
additional work in the future. While the ability to embed authorisation information mapped to 
protocol functions and objects was designed during this project, the current open-source imple-
mentation lacks this feature Future e൵ort is necessary to develop the taxonomy or language of 
authorisation SP1s for each SCADAprocess control protocol The client libraries would need to 
read and honour this authorisation information.
Finally, for this approach to progress reTuires developing more applications around its use Secu-
rity should be built into applications, and key management is at the base of this functionality. The 
current prototype was developed as a wrapper around an existing application, which has some 
negatives such as that odd network behaviour and potential application instability issues Future 
e൵orts are necessary to apply the ADKTM approach to a variety of applications to test perfor-
mance and behaviour.
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Through the implementation of a prototype system and execution of experimental tests, some dis-
tinct and critical things were discovered to enable a successful ADTKM system
PKINIT library support
:ith Kerberos, the choice is between two popular implementations²Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology MIT and +eimdal²both o൵ering uniTue strengths and weaknesses MIT Kerberos 
is more widely used and much older, hence its enterprise stability and strong development support. 
It has better documentation available and debugging capabilities. Issues that users come across are 
often discussed online, and one is more likely to ¿nd answers to problems when using the more 
popular tool, in general.
+owever, a /inux-based ¿eld device with Samba works as an Active Directory Domain Controller 
Samba requires Heimdal to use the PKINIT feature. Unfortunately, Heimdal has weak debugging 
capabilities that make it di൶cult to troubleshoot the many issues encountered
At the end of the day, both +eimdal and MIT Kerberos o൵er the same basic functionality they are 
Must handled in di൵erent ways The packages that need to be installed and the way con¿guration 
¿les need to be set up are di൵erent Getting the con¿guration ¿les correct was one of the trickiest 
tasks in this project, as there was a lot of contradictory information online.
106 Journal of Information Warfare 
An Automated, Disruption-Tolerant Device Authentication… 
Critical dependency on DNS
The Domain Name Server (DNS) is critical to the operation of the Kerberos protocol. Similar to a 
phone book, a DNS provides a directory of domain names and translates them to Internet Protocol 
(IP) addresses. Without the DNS in place, none of the devices would know how to communicate 
with another, which makes it a crucial component of the proMect Kerberos¶ functioning properly is 
highly dependent on devices being able to ¿nd each other and communicate fully
Originally, having the DNS on the Active Directory machine was tried. This proved to be trouble-
some if the connection to the main Active Directory machine was ever severed. Since the objective 
is for devices to be able to communicate and authenticate within the ¿eld, an alternative spot for a 
secondary DNS was necessary. It was decided a standalone local machine would provide contin-
ued operation even when the main Active Directory machine was disconnected. This allowed all 
the devices in play to communicate with each other throughout the tests, even when other import-
ant machines were disabled or turned o൵
Abnormal network behaviour from wrapped system call security
The I(C  library utilised in the prototype implementations of the ADTKM end devices pro-
vided a black-box communication process. All of the session establishment and socket control is 
handled within the library code and not exposed to the user. In order to add additional security to 
the I(C  protocol, it was necessary to wrap system calls such as send and receive with Sim-
ple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL). The result was to force Kerberos authentication to 
succeed before allowing the client and server devices to communicate.
This resulted in the masking of information passed between the applications on the two commu-
nicating devices. Due to the SASL wrapper, the communication was encrypted, and the data were 
unrecognisable when investigating pcap ¿les with analysis tools such as :ireshark This helped 
con¿rm some of the test cases that involved using =eek for analysis, while not interrupting =eek 
or any other logging from accessing the information they needed.
The wrapped system calls can a൵ect the ordering of steps in which the secure link is established, 
which in turn can cause di൵erences in the ordering of network tra൶c, which then a൵ects =eek 
analytics. An example is a non-trusted device that tries to establish a connection to another device 
and to keep it idle, and then acquires the key material needed to exchange any data. This requires 
the =eek monitoring system to listen for a µ¿rst data exchanged¶ event and not a µconnection es-
tablished¶ event
,&'¿OHQRQLQWHURSHUDELOLW\
One of the di൶culties encountered during development of the prototype virtual relay used for im-
plementing ADTKM was creation of a custom I(C  I(D Con¿guration Description ICD 
¿le that combined tags from several individual ICD ¿les from real-world I(Ds such as those from 
S(/ The process to combine tags from individual devices was very tedious and involved manual 
labour in creating a merged I(D ¿le to support a  enabled RTU
As there are no commercial devices that currently support I(C  with support for I(C , 
a prototype virtual relay that leveraged an I(C  software stack was used to validate the per-
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formance of ADTKM speci¿cally, the I(C  software stack provided by SystemCORP The 
process for this software to map data points in the ICD ¿le to the internal database is very cumber-
some as it requires a mapping to be established for each tag that is used manually. This process has 
to be performed individually for all tags and currently does not provide any support for automation 
or run-time modi¿cation using an external ¿le This limitation impacted the number of tags created 
in the prototype virtual relay and the speed at which changes could be made to test virtual proto-
type relays with di൵erent ICD ¿les as a part of testing and performance evaluation
In addition to the manual changes in an ICD ¿le, changing the datatype used reTuires extensive 
rewriting of the source code to update and read the tag. Additionally, the SystemCORP library has 
limitations on the number of servers and clients that can run on one device. Up to two clients were 
successfully deployed on one BeagleBone Black, but only a single server can be run. This limited 
the ability to perform some tests.
Test application interoperability
Over the course of the testing with Triangle Micro:orks¶ Distributed Test Manager, it was ob-
served that the I(C  software stack used did not work well to obtain the tag lists for the 
device in the Kepware K(Pserver(; OPC server via self-description This could be potentially 
attributed to I(C  interoperability issues by comparing and testing the self-description fea-
tures by connecting to a real-device that supports I(C 
Unexpected errors were observed that crashed the software during the testing of the use cases for 
the I(C  security comparisons These errors occurred due to incompatibility in the ; 
certi¿cate versions used for the Transport /ayer Security sessions
$SSHQGL[0LWLJDWHG5LVN6FHQDULRV
The following are six risk scenarios mitigated by the ADTKM system
6FHQDULR/RVVRI&RPPXQLFDWLRQWR&RQWURO5RRP
Emergency event
A fault condition is occurring, and communication to the control centre is lost Mitigations include
 TGT allows ¿eld authorisation for a user-con¿gurable time
 CRTC provides the ability to enable limited distributed authorisation;
 CRTC provides distributed logging and caching of what is happening to report back to the 
control room when connection is re-established for auditing and central control.
Third-party assistance
A situation occurs in which communication is lost to the control room and third-party ¿eld engi-
neers need to help restore service more Tuickly Mitigations include
 Authentication to provide TGT can be performed through secondary communication (such 
as cellular, satellite), which then enables access to local devices;
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 Through centralised service, temporary access to additional third-party ¿eld engineers
could be provided;
 See µScenario ¶ for general third-party access case

6FHQDULR,QWHJUDWRU7KLUG3DUW\$FFHVV
Often integrators, third-party vendors, or other utilities (in shared environments) need to access or 
communicate with eTuipment Mitigations include
 Cross-realm authentication (part of Kerberos);
 Additional trust checks these will be de¿ned as part of this proMect
 Zeek communication monitoring (detect probing deviation of process from insider threat).
6FHQDULR6SRR¿QJ0DQLQWKH0LGGOH0DVTXHUDGLQJ
An attacker has gotten onto the network (for example, compromised a computer, insertion into 
communication path Mitigations include
 Zeek communication sensing;
 Cryptographic protections of authenticationauthorisation communication
 Identities bound to devices with TPM
6FHQDULR6WROHQ'HYLFH
A device is stolen or compromised to use as a method to attackcompromise the rest of system 
Mitigations include
 TPM used for identity credentials protects from reuse of identity
 Zeek communication monitoring;
 See µScenario ¶ for further mitigations
6FHQDULR([SRVHG.H\(PSOR\HH)LUHGRU4XLW
For some reason, a key or set of keys is no longer secure In some instances, there are regulatory 
guidelines on how Tuickly cryptographic material and access control must be updated Mitigations 
include
 Central key information storage provides quick audit trail of what keys are being used and
their provenance;
 Token-based key system provides a short life span for authorised use of keys—users can
set this time;
 Centralised authenticationauthorisation process prohibits disabled accounts from obtain-
ing new keys.
6FHQDULR6HFXULW\$XGLW
Some utilities must comply with federal and regional cybersecurity regulations and be able to 
show they are meeting regulations Mitigation includes
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 Central key information storage provides quick audit trail of what keys are being used and 
their provenance.
$SSHQGL['HWDLOHG7HVW'HVFULSWLRQDQG5HVXOWV
Test Phase 1
IEC 61850/MMS to OPC server connection
This test case establishes
 Device can successfully connect to an OPC ObMect /inking and (mbedding for Pro-
cess ControlO/( for Process ControlOpen Platform Communications server via the 
I(CMMS protocol
 Device data structures can be accessed on OPC server via supplied ICD ¿le
 Device data structures can be accessed on OPC server via device self-description in com-
pliance with I(CMMS spec
Test Procedures:
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection to device IP via I(CMMS and connect
 Import ICD ¿le into OPC server and verify all data blocks have been imported
 Delete prior connection.
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection again and connect
 Select self-description and verify all data blocks have been imported.
 Capture 10-minute pcap for baseline time characteristics (latency, jitter, round trip time).
Test Results:
 Pass.
 OPC server was able to successfully connect with the RTU running the I(C  server 
using the ICD ¿le
 OPC server was not able to obtain tags via self-description from the RTU software. This 
was observed to be an issue with Triangle Micro:orks¶ Distributed Test Manager
 Based on the -minute pcap, here are the baseline timing characteristics: round-trip time 
~200 ms between the RTU and OPC server; ~1-4ms between the relay and RTU.
Device input/output
This test case establishes
 Device properly displays static measured values applied to the board IO for all possible 
analogue values the device can measure;
 Device properly displays dynamic measured values from the board IO for all analogue 
values that can be dynamic;
 Device properly shows digital inputs and operates digital outputs;
 Controllable outputs can be properly and stably controlled.
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Test Procedures:
 After connection with OPC server is established, verify all analogue input data blocks are
visible in OPC server.
 Verify all digital input data blocks are visible in OPC server.
 Verify all digital output data blocks are visible in OPC server.
 Apply full signal to digital inputs and verify OPC server shows inputs ON.
 Apply static half-scale values to analogue inputs and verify OPC server shows approxi-
mately correct half-scale value.
 Apply static full-scale values to analogue inputs and verify OPC server shows approxi-
mately full-scale value.
 Use OPC server to command digital outputs to close, and verify they do.
 Use OPC server to command digital outputs to open, and verify they do.
 Apply 10% scale values to analogue inputs, and verify OPC server shows approximately
th scale value
 Slowly increase analogue input values to 100% while monitoring the values reported by
the OPC server, and verify the response approximately matches the physical increase of
the signal.
 Repeat previous step with a slowly decreasing signal.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 All analogue and digital data blocks were visible in the OPC server.
 Values were tracking and responding to changes made in the simulator to drive the ana-
logue inputs throughout the range of 10-100% scale values.
 Values of digital input and output blocks were also visible in the OPC server and matched
the values on the RTU and the relay.
Loss of communication
This test case establishes
 I(C  substation operation continues to operate properly in the event of communica-
tions failure with outside devices andor networks
 This test disconnects the SCADA server from the network to verify device continues to
work in the substation.
Test Procedures:
 Disconnect the key server from the network the device is connected to.
 Verify that values are still being shown in OPC server.
 Change analogue input values, and verify changes show up in OPC server.
 (xercise digital inputs and outputs, and verify proper operation
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Test Results:
 Pass.
 The RTU was able to continue operation even when the communication link to the OPC 
server was lost.
 Changes in analogue and digital inputs were tracking appropriately.
 Digital outputs issued from the RTU were also seen updating on the relay appropriately.
6SRR¿QJ
This test case
 (stablishes proper operation in the event of spoofed tra൶c to the device
 SubMects the unsecured device to a spoo¿ngman-in-the-middle attack to establish baseline 
(unsecured) behaviour.
Test Procedures:
 Perform spoo¿ngman-in-the-middle attack on device, and record behaviour
 Setup secondary system with K(Pserver
 Set secondary system IP as the same as ¿rst K(Pserver
 Connect, and attempt to collect data and control IO
Test Results:
 Partial fail.
 :hen the ¿rst device was connected, any attempts to establish a connection to the relay 
from a spoofed RTU device were reset by the relay at the TCP layer by sending a reset.
 If the ¿rst RTU device connection was disconnected, then the victim device would accept 
the connection from the K(Pserver
Scanning
This test case
 (stablishes that the device does not react adversely to network scans and reports back 
properly;
 Subjects the device to active network scanning.
Test Procedure:
 Perform an active scan against the device IP address, and verify,
 IP address gets reported correctly by scanning tool, and
 Device remains responsive during and after scan.
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Test Results:
 Pass.
 The relay¶s IP address was corrected reported by the scanning tool 1map
 The relay remained responsive during and after the scan.
Replay attack
This test case
 (stablishes device behaviour when subMected to a replay attack where a previously record-
ed protocol interaction is played back at the device to induce unwanted actions;
 SubMects the device to a replay attack of network tra൶c, which is done to establish baseline,
unsecured device behaviour.
Test Procedures:
 Send control action to a digital IO
 Capture pcap of command.
 Craft replay packets of control command.
 Perform a replay attack against the relay.
 Capture pcap of the behaviour.
Test Results:
 Fail
 Crafting packets and injecting them using the Scapy python library successfully performs
control on a digital IO
 Success of this simplistic of an attack is predicated on the con¿guration of the ¿eld device
 Allowed mastercontroller IP addresses can be set in some eTuipment and as such, replay-
ing a command from another IP would not work.
 More sophisticated attacks such as session hiMacking could be performed that would achieve
similar results.
 Intent of this test is just to show that the default protocols lack authentication mechanisms
that are solved when deploying the security protocols in the second and third phases.
Test Phase 2
IEC 61850/MMS to OPC server connection
This test case establishes
 Device can successfully connect to an OPC ObMect /inking and (mbedding for Process
Control O/( for Process Control server via the I(CMMS protocol with I(C 
security;
 Device data structures can be accessed on OPC server via supplied ICD ¿le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 Device data structures can be accessed on OPC server via device self-description in com-
pliance with I(CMMS spec
 How much performance impact, if any, will occur during normal operation due to ADT-
KM
 =eek successfully detects the connection, extracts the correct certi¿cates, and does not 
cause a false alarm.
Test Procedures:
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection to device IP via I(C MMS and connect
 Import ICD ¿le into OPC server, and verify all data blocks have been imported
 Delete prior connection.
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection again and connect
 Select self-description, and verify all data blocks have been imported.
 Capture 10-minute pcap for analysis of time characteristics (latency, jitter, round trip time).
Test Results:
 Pass.
 Device connection to OPC established.
 Data structures able to be accessed on OPC server via device.
 Zeek logs detected and logged Kerberos activity.
 Based on the -minute pcap, round trip time: a ms between the RTU and OPC server, 
a ms between the relay and RTU with I(C  security implemented
Key update/new session
This test case establishes how much latency will be incurred due to the key management processes 
to authenticate and establish secure communication.
Test Procedures:
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection to device IP via I(C MMS, and connect
 Import ICD ¿le into OPC server, and verify all data blocks have been imported
 Delete prior connection.
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection again, and connect
 Select self-description, and verify all data blocks have been imported.
 Force new session establishment
 Capture pcap of the session establishment.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 Pcap ¿les obtained during Kerberos authentication process
 /og ¿les =eek logs, pcap ¿les show details behind timing, which can be used to deduce 
how much latency was incurred.
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Device input/output
This test case establishes that the ADTKM system does not interfere with control of Device IO
Test Procedures:
 After connection with OPC server is established, verify all analogue input data blocks are
visible in OPC server.
 Verify all digital input data blocks are visible in OPC server.
 Verify all digital output data blocks are visible in OPC server.
 Use OPC server to command digital outputs to close, and verify they do.
 Use OPC server to command digital outputs to open, and verify they do.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 /ogs showed that Device IO was intact while ADTKM systems active
Loss of communication to control room
This test case establishes
 Device and encryptiondecryption continue to operate properly in the event of communica-
tions failure with outside devices andor networks
 If Zeek successfully detects communication during the loss of communication to the con-
trol room, extracts the certi¿cate successfully, and correctly identi¿es if a TGT previously
granted can still be used or is invalid due to expiration.
Test Procedures:
 Disconnect the connection from the control centre to the substation Key Management
Server and SCADA server).
 Send a control command from RTU to the relay to control IO
 Document behaviour.
 Force a session reestablishment between RTU and relay
 Send a control command from RTU to the relay to control IO
 Document behaviour.
 Record Zeek logs to check if new key can be acquired from TGT without raising an error.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 =eek logs and pcap ¿les indicate device and encryption operated properly when communi-
cation with outside devices was lost.
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6SRR¿QJPDQLQWKHPLGGOHPDVTXHUDGLQJ
This test case establishes
 TPM chip on device is tied to device identity
 If Zeek communication monitoring successfully detects attempts to manipulate the key 
management process, Zeek checks the DevID and addresses of each communication path 
and whether the corresponding tickets are issued and not expiredrevoked
 (xpiredbroken tokens will not grant access
Test Procedures:
 Spoo¿ngmasTuerading
 Capture token delivered to key.
 (dit tokencraft new token with changedmanipulated values
 Capture logs from Zeek.
 Analyse to see if Zeek alerted on manipulation.
 Man-in-the-middle
 Set up an additional Kerberos with untrusted certi¿cate that accepts every user and pass-
word and forwards it to the real Kerberos.
 Capture logs from Zeek.
 Analyse to see if certi¿cate mismatch is found
Test Results:
 Partial pass.
 Used a variety of methods to spoofmasTuerade:
 Replayed an unedited pcap with tcpreplay. This was the most successful test in that Zeek 
detected partial Kerberos tra൶c±tgs reTuest
 Used :ir(edit to change IP info, timing info This test did not seem to generate any =eek 
logs.
 Used a python module called Scapy to replay both unedited and modi¿ed pcap ¿les This 
test saw tgs reTuests in the logs when using unedited pcap ¿les, but nothing when using 
modi¿ed pcap ¿les
 Open source C program KDCReplay ± used to capture pcap ¿les of speci¿cally Kerberos 
authentication and replay them. This program seemed promising but did not behave as 
expected.
 No attempt resulted in a successful attack.
 =eek logs and pcap ¿les show partial Kerberos tra൶c±tgs reTuest, but nothing more 1o 
alerts or error messages.
Stolen device
This test case establishes
 TPM chip prevents re-use of device identity
 (phemeral credential life span is short enough to prevent long-term use of it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 =eek successfully detects that keys are no longer valid and raises an alert, speci¿cally that
Zeek has successfully added these keys to a revocation list and correctly maps the captured
key to the list. This implies the keys are manually added to the revocation list.
Test Procedures:
 Remove device identity from Key Management Server
 Add device to blacklist, and check if Zeek received this updated blacklist.
 Attempt to establish a session with the µstolen¶ device
 Record successfailure of session establishment
 Check Zeek logs to see if successfully raised an alarm.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 =eek ¿les and pcap ¿les show attempted secure session that was reMected
 =eek ¿les show Kerberos error, but details of error didn¶t indicate a stolen device
Exposed key
This test case establishes
 =eek successfully detects that keys are no longer valid and raises an alert, speci¿cally that
Zeek has successfully added these keys to a revocation list and correctly maps the captured
key to the list.
Test Procedures:
 Add device to blacklist and check if Zeek received this updated blacklist.
 Attempt to establish a session with the µstolen¶ device
 Check Zeek logs to see if successfully raised an alarm.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 =eek ¿les indicate the key was revoked and gave a warning however, a secured connection
was still established.
Security audit
This test case establishes whether Zeek can successfully print all active connections.
Test Procedures:
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection to device IP via I(C MMS, and connect
 Import ICD ¿le into OPC server, and verify all data blocks have been imported
 Delete prior connection.
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 Con¿gure OPC server for connection again, and connect
 Select self-description, and verify all data blocks have been imported.
 Print all active connection from =eek, and con¿rm the list is accurate and complete
Test Results:
 Pass.
 Zeek found all devices in use (active connections) and printed them. List was accurate and 
complete.
Scanning of ADTKM assets
This test case establishes that attempts to scan DTKM assets that meet certain prede¿ned criteria 
andor exceed a certain threshold such as number of IP or ports addresses a൵ected are detected 
by Zeek monitoring system and an alarm is raised.
Test Procedures:
 Use Nmap to scan relays with aggressive settings.
 Check =eek list to see if it reports scanning from IP address fromto relays
Test Results:
 Pass.
 =eek con¿gured to scan for number of ports
 A notice was Àagged in the =eek logs
Failure/loss of key management server
This test case establishes
 Zeek can still operate even when CRTC is inoperable;
 Zeek alerts when the CRTC stops communicating or when key exchanges do not complete 
(for example, by looking for a lack of an ACK packet from the CRTC).
Test Procedures:
 Take CRTC down.
 Attempt to establish secure connections between relay and OPC server.
 Check if Zeek reports connection attempts as unsuccessful.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 Zeek was still functional with CRTC inoperable.
 Zeek alerted error messages when secured session did not complete.
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Unauthorised access attempts to ADTKM assets
This test case establishes that the Zeek sensor detects when there are attempts to attack the ADT-
KM services
Test Procedures:
 Use Nmap to scan relays with aggressive settings.
 Check =eek list to see if it reports scanning from IP address fromto relays
Test Results:
 Partial fail.
 Reports on scanning were minimal.
 No alerts or error messages were made.
Noncompliant Device
This test case
 (stablishes =eek validates all certi¿cates sent over the network against the root certi¿-
cate(s) and raises an alarm if validation fails;
 Determines if this is successful such that =eek correctly identi¿es a device attempting to
use expired or otherwise noncompliant keys that will cause an alarm from Zeek monitor-
ing.
Test Procedures:
 +ave a non-compliant device try to use the I(C port
 Zeek should report an error of untrusted device communicating.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 =eek logs and pcap ¿les indicate secure connection was attempted but failed
 =eek reported error of device being untrustedinvalid key
Replay Attack
This test case establishes
 Packets with invalid or expired time stamps are rejected, that is, a replay attack will be
ine൵ective
 Zeek can raise an alarm if a replay attack occurs and the key has expired (Zeek cannot
identify the payload of packets for keys that have not expired because they are encrypted,
and the keys are not yet known to Zeek).
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Test Procedures:
 Perform authenticationauthorisation with ¿eld device to get service key
 Capture token delivered to key.
 Replay token to service.
 Document successfailure of session establishment
 Capture logs from Zeek.
 Analyse to see if Zeek alerted on replay.
Test Results:
 Partial pass.
 =eek logs and pcap ¿les included an attempted secured connection
 =eek ¿les reported a TGS reTuest that was processed, but no more information
 No attempted replay attack was successful, as indicated by logs.
Attack against self-monitoring system
This test case establishes
 =eek can detect certain kinds of attacks, speci¿cally if the attacker is blocking the com-
munication between the central =eek instance and the =eek instance at the ¿eld device 
level, then revocation list transfers, and heartbeats to Central Zeek are not acknowledged; 
and as a consequence, an alarm is raised at the central location;
 An adversary is not able to fake acknowledgements as it is not in possession of the correct 
encryption keys that Zeek is using.
Test Procedures:
 Block =eek to =eek communication example, with a ¿rewall
 Check for alert from Zeek that communication is blocked.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 Connection severed between the two Zeek devices, errors and warnings were being printed.
Test Phase 3
IEC 61850/MMS to OPC server connection
This test case establishes
 Device can successfully connect to an OPC ObMect /inking and (mbedding for Process 
Control O/( for Process Control server via the I(CMMS protocol with I(C  
security;
 Device data structures can be accessed on OPC server via supplied ICD ¿le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 Device data structures can be accessed on OPC server via device self-description in com-
pliance with I(CMMS spec
 =eek successfully detects the connection, extracts the correct certi¿cates, and does not
cause a false alarm.
Test Procedures:
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection to device IP via I(CMMS, and connect
 Import ICD ¿le into OPC server, and verify all data blocks have been imported
 Delete prior connection.
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection again, and connect
 Select self-description, and verify all data blocks have been imported.
 Capture 10-minute pcap for analysis of time characteristics (latency, jitter, round trip time).
Test Results:
 Pass.
 The OPC server was able to successfully connect with the RTU running the I(C 
server using the ICD ¿le
 OPC server was not able to obtain tags via self-description from the RTU software. This
was observed to be an issue with Triangle Micro:orks¶ Distributed Test Manager
 Based on the -minute pcap, round trip time: a ms between the RTU and OPC server,
a ms between the relay and RTU with I(C  security implemented
Key update/new session
This test case establishes how much latency will be incurred due to the key management processes 
to authenticate and establish secure communication.
Test Procedures:
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection to device IP via I(CMMS, and connect
 Import ICD ¿le into OPC server, and verify all data blocks have been imported
 Delete prior connection.
 Con¿gure OPC server for connection again, and connect
 Select self-description, and verify all data blocks have been imported.
 Force new session establishment
 Capture PCAP of the session establishment.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 Used con¿guration ¿le in OPC server to load all data blocks as the self-description fea-
ture did not work on the Device Type Manager RTU software provided by Triangle Mi-
croWorks.
 
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 10 sessions were established, and the average latency for session establishment was found 
to be ~10-12 ms.
Device input/output
This test case establishes that the I(C  system does not interfere with control of Device IO
Test Procedures:
 After connection with OPC server is established, verify all analogue input data blocks are 
visible in OPC server.
 Verify all digital input data blocks are visible in OPC server.
 Verify all digital output data blocks are visible in OPC server.
 Use OPC server to command digital outputs to close and verify they do.
 Use OPC server to command digital outputs to open and verify they do.
Test Results:
 Pass.
 All the analogue and digital input data blocks were visible in the OPC server.
 The digital output commands sent out to the relay were also appropriately reÀected both in 
the RTU and relays.
Loss of communication to control room
This test case establishes that the device and encryptiondecryption continue to operate properly in 
the event of communications failure with outside devices andor networks
Test Procedures:
 Disconnect the connection from the control centre to the substation (OCSP and SCADA 
server).
 Send a control command from RTU to the relay to control IO
 Document behaviour.
 Force a session reestablishment between RTU and relay
 Send a control command from RTU to the relay to control IO
 Document behaviour.
Test Results:
 Partial fail.
 The RTU and relay communication continued properly as expected even when the connec-
tion to the OPC server was disconnected. However, it was also observed that the Distribut-
ed Test Manager software threw an unexpected error when a session reestablishment was 
forced causing the secure communication to fail between the RTU and the relay.
 The Distributed Test Manager software only provides support with static CR/s, which is 
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a supported standard mechanism but is not the default mechanism described in the I(C 
62351; the default is OCSP. Traditional CRL distribution is to utilise some online distri-
bution mechanism (such as webpage or share) to enable updates by end devices on some 
set time schedule (daily, weekly). The distribution lag problem with CRLs leaves the de-
vices in an unprotected state of allowing connections with no longer trusted identities for 
a period of time. OCSP on the other hand provides an online service that actively provides 
dynamic response on validity of certi¿cates and identities +owever, it reTuires constant 
connectivity. OCSP stapling is a technique that allows an entity to pre-grab their authen-
ticity response from an OCSP service to overcome this connectivity issue, but it lacks the 
authorisation and central policy control features that Kerberos does.
6SRR¿QJPDQLQWKHPLGGOHPDVTXHUDGLQJ
This test case establishes that certi¿cates bind identities to devices
Test Procedures:
 Man-in-the-middle:
 Capture session establishment packets.
 Replay packets.
 Document successfailure
Test Results:
 Pass.
 Any attempts to establish a connection to the relay from a spoofed RTU device were reset
by the relay at the TCP layer by sending a reset.
Stolen device
This test case establishes
 Certi¿cate revocation works
 +ow long it takes to take e൵ect
Test Procedures:
 Revoke certi¿cate for µstolen¶ device
 Attempt to establish a session with the µstolen¶ device
 Record successfailure of session establishment
Test Results:
 Pass.
 The stolen certi¿cate was revoked successfully, and this change was established within
~1.04s of updating the CRLs in the RTU. This test assumed instant delivery of the CRL to
the devices where in general scenarios there would be a lag for distribution.
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 The RTU rejected and terminated the connection attempt from a stolen relay by sending a 
TCP reset.
Failure/loss of OCSP/CRL server}
This test case establishes that the system can still operate even when the core service of the key 
management system is lost.
Test Procedures:
 Take OSCPCR/ server down
 Attempt to establish secure connections between relay and OPC server.
 Document successfailure
Test Results:
 Unable to complete.
 This test was not performed as the Distributed Test Manager software, which was used to 
simulate the I(C 
 (nabled relays did not support integration with a CR/ server via the network The CR/ 
¿les were generated and updated as a ¿le upload whenever there was a change
 Consequently, both the RTU and relay would continue to work without any issues as there 
is no reTuirement for the connection to the OCSPCR/ server to be up
Replay attack
This test case establishes that packets with invalid or expired time stamps are rejected, that is, that 
a replay attack will be ine൵ective
Test Procedures:
 Perform authenticationauthorisation between ¿eld device OCSP and CR/ server
 Capture authorisation.
 Perform another authentication authorisation with unauthorised device.
 Replay authorisation message from OCSP to ¿eld device
 Document successfailure of session establishment
 Fail is the expected outcome
Test Results:
 Pass.
 There was no response from the RTU when an unauthorised ¿eld device tried to establish 
a session with the RTU by replaying packets from an earlier session.
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